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Abstract 
 
This study investigates whether regulations have an independent effect on bank risk-taking or 
whether their effect is channeled through the market power possessed by banks. Given a 
well-established set of theoretical priors, the regulations considered are capital requirements, 
restrictions on bank activities and official supervisory power. We use data from the Central 
and Eastern European banking sectors over the period 1998-2005. The empirical results 
suggest that banks with market power tend to take on lower credit risk and have a lower 
probability of default. Capital requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with market 
power this effect significantly weakens. Higher activity restrictions in combination with more 
market power reduce both credit risk and the risk of default, while official supervisory power 
has only a direct impact on bank risk.    
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1. Introduction 
As we learn more about the dynamics of financial stability, three interrelated 
characteristics of the banking sector are receiving increasing attention by scholars and policy 
makers, namely regulations, competition, and risk-taking. The relationship between these 
three factors (RCR hereafter) is nurtured in an important paper by Keeley (1990), who 
argued that deregulation of the US banking sector in the 1970s and 1980s increased 
competition and, through the associated reduction in monopoly rents, led to a worsened 
equilibrium risk of failure. Keeley’s paper triggered a lively debate on the possible RCR 
nexus both at the theoretical (see Hellmann et al., 2000; Cordella and Yeyati, 2002; Repullo, 
2004; Niinimaki, 2004) and the empirical level (Salas and Saurina, 2003; Chen, 2007).1 Yet, 
researchers have not examined empirically whether and how national regulations, such as 
restriction on activities, capital requirements, and supervisory power, interact with market 
power in shaping the risk-taking behavior of individual banks. This can have important 
policy implications as different types of regulation may have a direct or indirect (through 
market power) impact on bank risk-taking. It could also mean that the same regulations have 
different effects on bank risk taking depending on the comparative market power of the 
banks. In this paper, we attempt to extend our knowledge on the RCR nexus towards this 
direction and provide some additional insights in the dawn of the global financial crisis. 
A first element worth noting is that the spotlight is placed on the transition countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Since the mid 1990s, the banking systems of CEE 
countries were extensively reformed through the abolition of administrative interventions and 
regulations, which seriously hampered their development. The reforms have been viewed as 
a means to reduce bank costs, particularly those associated with risk management and the 
evaluation of credit information. Institutional improvements, such as effective systems for 
taking collateral and repossessing assets in cases of default, played a fundamental role in the 
further development of the CEE banking sector. On the whole, and given the restructuring 
                                                 
1 A rich literature also focuses on the relationship between competition and risk-taking, only. For instance, 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) focus on the impact of increases in interest rates or collateral requirements on the 
riskiness of banks' loan portfolio in the presence of excess demand. Allen and Gale (2004) focus on the trade-
off between competition and stability, and show that it is complex and multi-faceted as such a trade-off does not 
necessarily exists in all cases. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) review the literature and describe the existing 
evidence as mixed. They also derive a theoretical model which shows that as competition declines, banks earn 
more rents in the loan markets by charging higher loan rates, which however imply higher bankruptcy risk for 
borrowers. Then, within a moral hazard framework, borrowers optimally increase their own risk of failure, 
which naturally leads to financial instability.   
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and regulatory initiatives that took place in the last decade, the CEE region provides an 
excellent case for the study of the RCR nexus in banking.2  
Moreover, as Haselmann and Wachtel (2007) point out, although research on banking 
in transition is voluminous the issues of risk-taking and risk management are not well-
documented. At the same time, it is well-known that banks behave differently under different 
institutional settings (Berger et al., 2001; Berger and Udell, 2002; Haselmann and Wachtel, 
2006), which implies that the results obtained for developed countries may not apply to the 
transition ones. In addition, the regulatory efforts undertaken in transition banking systems 
are quantitatively and qualitatively different from the analogous ones of developed banking 
systems. For example, deregulation in developed countries aims to increase competition and 
enhance efficiency, while in developing countries stability and risk reduction can be one of 
the main objectives. This has important implications in the way an empirical framework is 
built. For instance, Keeley (1990) uses dummy variables as proxies of regulatory relaxation 
in branching, interstate expansion and multibank holding company restrictions. Similarly, 
Salas and Saurina (2003) use dummies as proxies of changes in regulations, while Chen 
(2007) uses a dummy variable to note the completion of the second banking directive. In the 
present study, we rely on information from the World Bank (WB) database on bank 
regulations and supervision (Barth et al., 2001a, 2006, 2008) to construct indices that relate 
to capital requirements, official supervisory power and restrictions on bank activities. This is 
the first study that considers these indices, while examining the relationship between 
regulations, competition, and risk-taking.3 These indices can be more informative than the 
dummy variables and allow us to consider a more harmonized measure that is of particular 
importance in a cross-country setting. We focus on these three regulatory policies because 
they are central in the agenda of policy makers and theory suggests that they can have both a 
direct impact on risk-taking but also an indirect effect through market power. Thus, we aim 
to provide an empirical assessment of whether and how they interact with banks’ market 
power in shaping risk-taking.   
The empirical analysis is carried out for 13 CEE banking systems over the period 
1998-2005. In line with recent work on the measurement of bank competition (e.g. Jimenez 
et al., 2007), we develop extensive new non-structural indices of bank-level market power, 
                                                 
2 For a detailed review of the reform process in the CEE countries’ financial sectors see various issues of the 
EBRD Transition reports (e.g. Transition report 2006: Finance in transition). 
3 Beck et al. (2006a) and Schaeck et al. (2009) have also used these indices as control variables in their 
somehow related cross-country studies. However, these studies are at the country rather than the bank-level and 
they examine systemic crises rather than bank risk-taking. As Beck et al. (2006a) suggest research at the bank-
level may be able to shed more light on the puzzling results of their study.  
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which are subsequently used to examine the RCR nexus. Also, to account for the fact that 
static econometric frameworks may be insufficient to capture the dynamics of the reform, we 
complement the static econometric framework with a dynamic one. Statistical robustness is 
further ensured by extensive misspecification tests and re-specifications of the empirical 
frameworks, the latter including the potential existence of a non-linear relationship between 
risk and competition as in Jimenez et al. (2007). The empirical results imply that banks with 
market power are associated with lower credit risk and a lower probability of default. Capital 
requirements reduce risk in general, but for banks with market power this effect significantly 
weakens. Higher activity restrictions in combination with more market power reduce both 
credit risk and the risk of default. Finally, official supervisory power has only a direct impact 
on bank risk.     
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a theoretical 
discussion to back up our choice for the specific types of regulation considered. Section 3 
presents the empirical model and discusses the data sources. Section 4 discusses the 
empirical results and Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Background discussion   
In the subsections that follow we provide a brief literature review of studies that relate 
bank regulation with competition and risk taking. This literature is initiated with the 
important contribution of Keeley (1990) who provided both a theoretical framework and 
empirical evidence that the deregulation of the US banking sector led to an erosion of bank 
market power and consequently of their equity capital. In turn, this increased banks’ 
incentives to take on extra risk, thus also increasing the risk of failure. Below we explicitly 
comment on the studies that followed Keeley’s analysis in terms of the three types of 
regulation considered in the present paper, namely capital requirements, restriction on 
activities and supervisory power. Note that most of the studies that examine whether the 
impact of regulations on risk-taking is channeled through market power are theoretical in 
nature, with empirical evidence being limited.    
 
2.1. Capital requirements 
Capital requirements can influence competition and risk-taking in various ways. First, 
high initial capital stringency requirements can impose entry barriers for newcomers. This 
would restrict competition and allow existing banks to accumulate power, resulting in a more 
prudent, less-risky behavior. Second, higher overall capital requirements are associated with 
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higher fixed costs of running the bank and, consequently, fewer banks will be able to afford 
these costs. Third, as Bolt and Tieman (2004) illustrate within a dynamic theoretical 
framework, more stringent capital adequacy requirements lead banks to set stricter 
acceptance criteria for granting new loans. In contrast to the latter argument, Hellmann et al. 
(2000) suggest that in addition to the capital-at-risk effect, there is an opposite effect that 
harms franchise value and encourages gabling. On the same line with Hellman et al. (2000), 
Matutes and Vives (2000) and Repullo (2004) conclude that capital requirements may not be 
enough and additional regulations such as deposit rate controls, deposit premiums or asset 
restrictions could be useful in reducing risk within a competitive environment. Niinimaki 
(2004) considers different market structures and suggests that if the bank is a monopoly or 
banks are competing only in the loan market, deposit insurance has no influence on risk-
taking. However, when banks are competing for deposits the introduction of a deposit 
insurance scheme increases risk-taking, as banks with lower charter values tend to have 
lower solvency and higher credit risk. 
 
2.2. Restrictions on bank activities 
The theoretical model of Matutes and Vives (2000) suggests that asset restrictions can 
complement deposit insurance and capital requirements in limiting risk-taking when 
competition is intense. As discussed in Beck (2008), the activity and branching restrictions 
that were enforced after the financial crises of the 1930s aimed to restrict competition and 
enhance stability. Yet, the financial liberalization in the 1970s and 1980s resulted in 
“unchecked” competition and was considered as one of the determinants of banking fragility 
(Keeley, 1990). The empirical evidence may be better described as mixed. Claessens and 
Laeven (2004) find that lower restrictions on activity lead to more competition. In turn, this 
increase in competition could have a negative effect on profits and the charter value of banks, 
encouraging greater risk-taking. On the other hand, low restrictions could allow the creation 
of large financial conglomerates, reducing competition in the market. Beck et al. (2004) 
document such a positive correlation between concentration and restrictions on activities in 
the banking industry. Furthermore, evidence from studies that look at the diversification 
opportunities of banks across various market segments suggest that restrictions on bank 
activities will influence competition and bank behavior in other segments of the market. For 
example, Lepetit et al. (2008a) find that higher reliance on fee-based activities is associated 
with underpriced borrower default risk; and Lepetit et al. (2008b) show that expanding into 
non-interest income activities increases the risk of insolvency. 
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 2.3. Official supervisory power 
Levine (2003) discusses that, in general, powerful official supervisors could improve 
the governance of banks and promote competition. Indeed, we have established that as banks 
will experience an increase in competition they may take on additional risks. In this respect, a 
strong and independent supervisor would be able to prevent managers from engaging in an 
excessive risk-taking behavior. However this may not always be the case, especially in 
transition economies. For example, and under the political/regulatory capture view, powerful 
banks may confine politicians and induce supervisors to act in the interest of banks rather 
than the interest of the society (see e.g. Stigler, 1971). If this were the case, banks would 
retain and enhance their market power (see Delis and Pagoulatos the impact on risk-taking, 
2008). Therefore, even though we do not have priors on how these opposing forces would 
affect risk-taking, we can come up with the following suggestions. On the one hand, higher 
charter values associated with decreased competition would provide incentives for more 
prudent investment decisions and lower risk-taking. On the other hand, if powerful banks 
will decide to increase their risk-taking it may be more difficult for politically connected 
supervisors to impose any restrictions. 
 
3. Empirical specification and data 
Given the considerations of the theoretical and empirical literature described above, 
we specify the following empirical model to study the relationship between bank risk-taking, 
competition and regulation (the latter in the form of capital requirements, activity restrictions 
and supervisory power):  
0 1 2 1 3 1 4 4it it t it t it t itr b b L b reg b L reg b x b m u− −= + + + × + + +      (1) 
In this specification, bank risk-taking r of bank i at year t is written as a function of bank 
market power, L; time-dependent indices of bank regulation, reg; a vector of bank-level 
variables reflecting the characteristics of each bank, x; variables that reflect the industry and 
macroeconomic conditions common to all banks, m; and the error term u. 
  We proxy the risk-taking behavior of banks by both the ratio of non-performing 
loans to total loans, and the Z-index, in alternative specifications. The first measure reflects 
the credit risk position of a bank. The CEE banks have inherited from the previous centrally-
planned economies a considerable volume of nonperforming loans. In these countries 
banking laws were generally developed to promote sound banking practices among existing 
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and new market players, and to increase the efficiency of delivering intermediation services. 
Banks would therefore improve their performance by improving screening and monitoring of 
credit risk, with such policies involving the forecasting of future levels of risk. The Z-index, 
in turn, represents a more universal measure of bank risk-taking and is defined as 
( ) / ( )Z ROA EA ROAσ= + , where ROA is the rate of return on assets, EA is the ratio of 
equity to assets and σ(ROA) is an estimate of the standard deviation of the rate of return on 
assets. This risk measure is monotonically associated with the probability of a bank’s default 
and has been widely used in the empirical banking and finance literature (see e.g. Boyd et al., 
2006). To calculate the standard deviation of ROA we use data on ROA from the two 
previous years and we verified that using three or four years produces very similar results.  
 
3.1. Measuring bank market power 
Claessens and Laeven (2004), Schaeck et al. (2009) and Yildirim and Philippatos 
(2007) derive country-specific Panzar and Rosse (1987) H-statistics, which they 
subsequently regress on a number of explanatory variables using cross-sectional estimation 
methods. However, some authors (see e.g. Shaffer, 2004) convincingly suggest that the H-
statistic does not map into a range of oligopoly solution concepts as robustly as the Lerner 
index (i.e. the markup of output price over marginal cost) does, mainly owing to partial 
failure to incorporate long-run structural adjustments. For example, Angelini and Cetorelli 
(2003) recognize this and estimate Lerner indices for each year in the sample period, which 
are also regressed on a number of explanatory variables in a second stage of analysis, again 
using cross-sectional methods. 
Here we opt for a bank-level Lerner index and to this end we obtain an estimate of the 
marginal cost at the country level and we use this marginal cost to obtain the Lerner index 
from the formula  
( )qit it t it/
qL p mc p= −           (2)  
where  is the price of bank output (calculated as the ratio of interest income to total 
earning assets). The marginal cost (mc) is estimated on the basis of the following translog 
cost function: 
q
itp
2 2
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
7 8 9
1 1 1ln ln (ln ) ln (ln ) ln (ln )
2 2 2
            (ln )(ln ) (ln )(ln ) (ln )(ln )
it it it it it it it
it it it it it it it
C b b q b q b d b d b w b w
b q w b q d b d w e
= + + + + + + +
+ + +
2
  (3) 
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where C is the total cost of bank i at time t, q is bank output (measured by total earning 
assets), d is the value of bank deposits, w are the prices of inputs and e is a stochastic 
disturbance. Variables with bars represent deviations from their means, specified in this way 
to reduce multicollinearity (see Uchida and Tsutsui, 2005; Brissimis et al., 2008). Within this 
framework, in the special case of Cournot competition L is simply the output share of the ith 
bank at each point in time. In the case of perfect competition, L = 0; under pure monopoly, L 
= 1; and, finally, L < 0, implies pricing below marginal cost and could result, for example, 
from a non-optimizing behavior of banks. The merit of this approach is that it provides bank-
level estimates of market power to be used in the subsequent analysis. 
Data for the variables are obtained from BankScope. C is proxied by total expenses, q 
by total earning assets and d by total deposits and short-term funding. w represents three 
input prices, i.e. the price of funds (measured by the ratio of interest expenses to total 
deposits), the price of labor (measured by the ratio of personnel expenses to total assets4) and 
the price of physical capital (measured by the ratio of depreciation and other capital expenses 
to total fixed assets). Table 1 contains these variables, along with some descriptive statistics. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
Estimation of Eq. (3) is carried out for each country separately using the method of 
maximum likelihood and average results of L on a country and time basis are presented in 
Table 2.5 The picture presented by the estimates is mixed, with some countries reflecting 
fairly competitive practices (e.g. Bulgaria and Romania), other reflecting anticompetitive 
behavior (Lithuania and Slovenia), and most lying in between. Changing patterns over time 
are also different on a country by country basis. For example, Latvian banks move towards 
more anticompetitive behavior on average, while Slovakian banks move towards the opposite 
direction. An interesting pattern is observed in the more developed countries of the group 
(Czech Republic, Poland, Slovenia), where higher values are observed in the middle of the 
                                                 
4 We define the price of labor as total personnel expenses divided by total assets because BankScope does not 
include comprehensive information on bank staff members for the countries considered. Many other studies 
have followed a similar approach (see e.g. Altunbas et al., 2001). 
5 We used the method of maximum likelihood to be in line with the majority of banking papers on cost 
efficiency/market power. Several robustness checks were performed; however, the results remained unchanged 
at the 10% level of significance. In particular, we used two-stage least squares instead of maximum likelihood, 
we included risk and ownership variables (public vs. private, foreign vs. domestic) among bank inputs in the 
cost and revenue equations and we trimmed the 5% of the samples to reduce the potential impact of outliers. All 
these results are available upon request.   
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examined period. This may suggest that market power has been the result of networking, 
owing to the weak institutional environment; however, penetration of foreign-owned banks 
and institutional advances before the accession of these countries in the EU may be 
responsible for the decreasing values in the last years of our sample. Finally, it is worth 
noting that in some of the less developed countries (e.g. Serbia and Romania in the first few 
years) banks are not behaving as optimizing firms on average.   
 
3.2. Regulatory variables 
The principal focus of this study is to examine whether the regulatory tools discussed 
in Section 2 (i.e. capital requirements, activity restrictions on banks and official supervisory 
power) have an impact on bank risk-taking through the level of market power of banks. To 
quantify the three classes of regulation we use the approach followed by Barth et al. (2001b, 
2006, 2008).6 Specifically, regulatory indices are constructed that relate to capital 
requirements (caprq), official supervisory power (spower) and restrictions on activities 
(actrs). We briefly discuss these indices below, while additional information can be found in 
Appendix A.  
The first index (caprq) shows the extent of both initial and overall capital stringency. 
Initial capital stringency refers to whether the sources of funds counted as regulatory capital 
can include assets other than cash or government securities and borrowed funds, as well as 
whether the regulatory or supervisory authorities verify these sources. Overall capital 
stringency indicates whether risk elements and value losses are considered while calculating 
the regulatory capital. Theoretically, caprq can take values between 0 and 8, with higher 
values of indicating more stringent capital requirements. In our case, it ranges between 2 (e.g. 
Latvia-1999) and 8 (e.g. Slovenia-2002). The second index (spower) reveals the power of the 
supervisory agencies to take specific actions in relation to their authority against bank 
management and directors, shareholders, and bank auditors. In the present paper, the index 
ranges between 6 (e.g. Serbia) and 14 (e.g. Hungary) with higher values indicating more 
powerful supervisors. The last index (actrs) is determined by considering whether securities, 
                                                 
6 This approach has been also followed by Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005), Pasiouras et al. (2006) and Buch 
and DeLong (2008) among others. An alternative would be to use principal component analysis as in Beck et al. 
(2006b). Barth et al. (2004) have followed both approaches, mentioning that on the one hand the drawback of 
using the summation for the construction of the index is that it assigns equal weight to each of the questions, 
whereas on the other hand the disadvantage of the first principal component is that it is less obvious how a 
change in the response to a question modifies the index. While they only report the empirical results on the 
basis of the latter approach, they mention (p. 218) that “we have confirmed all this paper’s conclusions using 
both methods”.  
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insurance, real estate activities, and ownership of non-financial firms are unrestricted, 
permitted, restricted, or prohibited. Theoretically, this index can range between 1 and 4 and 
as in the case of caprq and spower, higher values indicate higher restrictions. In the present 
study, actrs takes values between 1.25 (e.g. Estonia- 2002) and 3.25 (e.g. Romania-1999).   
We should note here that new regulatory initiatives are unlikely to affect the risk-
taking behavior of banks in the immediate term, especially through changes in market power. 
If regulations affect risk-taking, then it is expected that there are lags between establishing 
new banking laws or taking new policy initiatives (that will be reflected in the corresponding 
indices) and the time that these laws or initiatives are translated into more sound banking 
practices. Therefore, to the very best, the regulatory practices of the previous period are 
expected to impact the contemporaneous level of bank risk-taking. In fact, in the estimations 
below, we will be using both the first and the second lags of the regulation variables. 
 
3.3. Other controls  
A number of bank- and industry-level control variables are employed to improve the 
fit of our model. The former variables include the cost to income ratio and a proxy for bank 
size. The cost to income ratio (non-interest operating costs to total bank revenue) is used to 
control for differences in technical efficiency (see also Boyd et al., 2006), while the natural 
logarithm of real total assets (lnta) is used as a scaling variable. The industry-level controls 
include exogenous determinants of risk common to all banks. Specifically, we include the 
rate of GDP growth (gdpg) as a proxy for the fluctuations in economic activity, and a short-
term interest rate (ir), which serves as an indicator of the monetary environment. In addition 
to the macroeconomic variables, we also use foreign (for) and public (pub) ownership as 
potential determinants of bank competition. for is defined as the per cent of foreign owned 
banks in terms of total industry assets and pub as the per cent of publicly owned banks in 
terms of total industry assets (for descriptive statistics, see Table 1).  As a final control, we 
employ an index of market discipline (mdisc), which reflects the degree to which banks are 
forced to disclose accurate information to the public (e.g. disclosure of off-balance sheet 
items, risk management procedures, etc.) and whether there are incentives to increase market 
discipline such as subordinated debt and an absence of deposit insurance schemes.7 In 
                                                 
7 Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) show that several countries have established a system of national 
deposit insurance over the last 25 years, this being viewed as a way of avoiding bank runs. However, when 
deposit insurance is in effect, depositors may have no incentives to monitor banks, which may result in a 
decrease in market discipline (see e.g. Dermirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). See Calomiris (1999), Evanoff 
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accordance with the discussion of the rest of the regulatory indices above, this index enters 
the estimated equations lagged once.  
 
3.3. Data sources 
Our sample consists of 546 banks operating in the 13 CEE countries shown in Tables 
1 and 2 over the period 1998-2005. We collect our data from a number of sources. Individual 
bank data are taken from BankScope. Data for caprq, spower, mdisc, and actrs, are obtained 
from the World Bank database on “Bank Regulation and Supervision” developed by Barth et 
al. (2001a) and updated by Barth et al. (2006, 2008). Since this database is available at only 
three points in time we use information from Version I for bank observations over the period 
1998-2000, from Version II for bank observations over the period 2001-2003, and from 
Version III for bank observations for 2004-2005.8 Data for the market structure (for, pub) 
and macroeconomic conditions (ir, invgdp, gdpg) are collected from the EBRD’s Transition 
Reports and the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
 
4. Estimation and results 
In this section, we investigate whether regulations and competition affect the degree 
of bank risk-taking separately or whether the effect of regulations is channeled through bank 
market power. We opt for both static and dynamic specifications of the empirical model 
specified above. The static specification is the norm in the literature and refers to the 
estimation of Eq. (1). Yet, Berger et al. (2000), among others, have shown that even a 
developed banking industry, such as that of the US, is subject to impediments that yield 
various forms of persistence in bank-level rents. One of these impediments refers to the 
interrelationship between bank risk-taking and impediments to competition. If for example a 
banking industry is characterized by informational opacity owing to networking, it is likely 
that the bonds that created the networking are strong and thus persistent. Two other 
arguments can be made in favor of a dynamic formulation. First, the potential impact of stock 
variables on flow variables (such as non-performing loans) may be better approximated by a 
                                                                                                                                                       
and Wall (2000), DeYoung et al. (2001), Bliss (2001), Jagtiani et al. (2000), Berger et al. (2000) among others 
for the role of subordinated debt in promoting discipline in banking.  
8 Version I was released in 2001 and contain information for 117 countries (Barth et al., 2001a). For most of the 
countries, information corresponds to 1999, while for others information is either from 1998 or 2000. Version II 
describes the regulatory environment at the end of 2002 in 152 countries (Barth et al., 2006) and Version III 
describes the regulatory environment in 142 countries in 2005/06 (Barth et al., 2008). Many other studies that 
have used this database across a number of years followed a similar approach (e.g. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache, 2002; Fernandez and Gonzalez, 2005). 
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dynamic formulation (see Laeven and Majnoni, 2003). And second, Allen and Gale (2000, 
2004) in considering a variety of different theoretical models of the risk-regulation nexus 
showed that regulations can have a negative effect on risk taking within a static model and a 
positive effect within a dynamic model.  
Given the above, we augment the static model of Eq. (1) with a lagged dependent 
variable as follows: 
0 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 5it it t t it t it t itr b r b b reg b reg b x b mδ θ θ− − −′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′= + + + + × + + + ε ′
                                                
    (4) 
A value of δ between 0 and 1 implies that the dependent variables of the above equations 
persist, but they will eventually return to their normal (average) level. Values close to 0 mean 
that the speed of adjustment is high, while values close to 1 imply very slow adjustment.9  
The choice of the estimation procedure rests on the special features of each empirical 
model. Estimation of Eq. (1) is carried out using panel data instrumental variables regression. 
There are two main reasons for this choice. First, it may be possible that after deregulation of 
the CEE banking systems started, and taking into account the huge transformation of the 
economy and the society of these countries within a small period, credit risk increased 
significantly. This led to increased financial instability (note the crises in the CEE banking 
sectors during the late 1990s10) and in an effort to smooth the turmoil the supervisory 
authorities reacted by setting new rules and taking new initiatives that are reflected in the 
regulatory indices. Therefore, it is likely that reverse causality prevails between bank risk 
taking and each of competition and regulation.11 To prevent our model from capturing this 
adverse causality, we instrument against all risk and macroeconomic variables, their first lags 
and country dummies, in Eq. (1).12  
As regards Eq. (4), we use the system GMM estimator proposed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998). Besides accounting for the specified dynamics, this estimator has two 
additional virtues. First, it does not break down in the presence of unit roots (for a proof see 
Binder et al., 2003) and second it accommodates the possible endogeneity between the risk, 
 
9 The coefficients on the lagged values take implausible values (e.g. negative or very small) for panels with a 
very small time dimension and are highly dependent on the robustness of the estimation method (see Nerlove, 
2002). 
10 For details on these crises, see Laeven and Valencia (2008). 
11 Note that it may also be the case that as bank failures increase, the resulting higher degree of concentration in 
the industry does not necessarily imply more market power for surviving banks. Banks that do not fail are 
usually the more efficient bank, which effectively have lower costs in producing the same outputs (Beck et al., 
2006). Using bank-level markups instead of a concentration ratio to measure market power safeguards our 
empirical analysis from capturing such a misleading relationship (we thank an anonymous referee for raising 
this point).  
12 This is a random effects panel IV regression. The validity of random effects against fixed effects has been 
verified by a Hausman test.  
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market power and regulation variables by means of appropriate instruments.13 The 
instruments used are the same with the IV regressions and the validity of the instruments is 
verified by a Sargan test. A final practical issue in estimating Eq. (4) is that the interaction 
terms are highly collinear with their components. An easy way to reduce multicollinearity is 
by “centering” the variables. We do this by subtracting the mean from each observation and 
we observe that correlation of all independent variables is now below 40 per cent.  
Table 3 reports the empirical results when npl is the dependent variable. We find a 
negative and significant association between market power and non-performing loans that is 
robust across all specifications (whether static or dynamic). Capital requirements appear to 
be an effective tool in reducing credit risk on average, a finding consistent with Barth et al. 
(2004) and Kopecky and VanHoose (2006). Also, consistent with the expectations of the 
supervisory power hypothesis, spower has a negative and independent effect on credit risk. 
Notably, in the regressions that include the interaction between market power and these two 
supervisory tools, only the interaction between market power and caprq enters with a 
positive and significant coefficient. This holds regardless of whether the level of caprq is 
included in the estimated equation. This shows that caprq has an independent effect on risk, 
but this effect decreases for banks with higher market power. In other words, this finding 
suggests that the stabilizing effects of capital regulations diminish when the banks have 
sufficient power to increase their credit risk.  
The impact of actrs is insignificant, indicating that there is no direct effect of activity 
restrictions on credit risk. However, its interaction with market power enters negatively and 
significant (see columns 4 to 7), which implies that activity restrictions increase the credit 
risk-taking of banks with low market power. One potential explanation for this finding is that 
as the integration of financial services is restricted, banks focus on the loan market in order to 
replace the forgone non-interest income. However, due to the increased competition, banks 
with low market power in lending may view the financing of risky borrowers as the only way 
to attract customers and increase their market share.  
 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
                                                 
13 To guarantee robustness we control for country heterogeneity and temporal variation in the above 
specifications through the appropriate use of dummy variables (see Baltagi, 2001). These dummy variables have 
been found jointly statistically significant in virtually all equations, but they are not reported to save space.  
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The results in Table 4 present the estimations when we use the Z-index as an overall 
measure of insolvency risk. Differences between static and dynamic models are negligible, 
however the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable is highly significant indicating a 
considerable level of persistence in bank risk. On the same line with the results in Table 3, 
lower competition and higher supervisory power result in lower bank risk. As before the 
interaction between competition and supervisory power does not influence risk. However, we 
observe some differences in the direct effects of actrs and caprq. As Claessens (2003) points 
out, the integration of financial services is a debated topic, especially for emerging markets. 
While, theoretically, lowering the restrictions on bank activities increases the possibilities of 
risk diversification, it also provides more opportunities to increase and shift risk. 
Furthermore, it will be more difficult for supervisors to monitor complex banks that offer a 
variety of services, and this problem can become even more severe in emerging countries 
where supervision can be weak and enforcement will tend to be lower. Another problem 
highlighted in Claessens (2003) is that due to reduced transparency and complicated 
structures of ownership and control, financial conglomerate groups can experience important 
corporate governance problems, which are generally already large in emerging markets. This 
would be expected to have an adverse effect in the monitoring and control of risk-taking by 
managers. Our results support these arguments in showing that stricter restrictions on bank 
activities are effective in reducing insolvency risk, a finding that it is consistent with the 
empirical results of Fernandez and Gonzalez (2005). This result is also consistent with the 
findings of Lepetit et al. (2008a,b) who show that the involvement in various activities that 
generate non-interest income results in higher risk-taking. This risk generated from the 
involvement in non-interest income related activities could also explain why actrs has a 
direct impact on overall risk, but not on credit risk. Turning to the capital requirements we 
find that they do not directly influence overall insolvency risk, a finding consistent with 
Barth et al. (2004).  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
 Consistent with the results in Table 3, L*caprq and L*actrs, enter in the relevant 
specifications (columns 4-7) with a significant coefficient. In particular, capital requirements 
have an effect on risk via and combined with the level of market power (since they appear 
statistically significant whether the caprq variable is included in the estimated equation or 
not). When a bank has high market power, capital requirements increase insolvency risk. 
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This result contradicts prior expectations as for the efficiency of capital requirements to 
avoid moral hazard problems. In more detail, the underlying idea of this argument is that 
with higher capital requirements banks will hold higher amounts of capital, implying higher 
losses for shareholders in the case of default and therefore lower incentives for risk-taking 
through more prudent investments. However, Hellman et al. (2000) argue that this traditional 
view does not consider the dynamic effect of capital requirements on the bank’s franchise 
value. They argue that, in a dynamic scenario, an increase in the amount of capital has not 
only the positive capital risk effect but also a franchise value effect that moves in the opposite 
direction due to lower profits. However, lower franchise values imply stronger incentives for 
risk-taking. Thus, our results support the franchise-value-effect hypothesis, with risk-taking 
being conditional on the market power of the banks. In contract, the positive sign of L*actrs 
shows that activity restrictions limit the risk-taking of banks with high market power, thus 
enhancing bank soundness. Overall, it seems that ignoring the interactions between 
regulations and market power will lead to erroneous inferences about the impact of 
regulations on both credit risk and overall risk. 
Turning to the control variables, we observe that consistent with the private 
monitoring hypothesis, regulatory proposals (e.g. European Shadow Financial Regulatory 
Committee, 1999, 2000) and past studies (e.g. Calomiris, 1999; Barth et al., 2004; Fernandez 
and Gonzalez, 2005; Demirgüç-Kunt et al., 2008) financial disclosures and other incentives 
that enhance market discipline can be an effective tool in decreasing risk. Bank ownership 
appears to be another important parameter, with a higher presence of foreign (state-owned) 
banks in the market resulting in lower (higher) risk-taking which are consistent with the 
literature that suggests a number of benefits from the entry of foreign banks in emerging 
markets,14 as well as the negative impact of state-owned banks on the banking sector (see La 
Porta et al., 2002; Demirgüç-Kunt and Serven, 2009, for discussions). Consistent with our 
expectations, higher GDP growth lowers credit risk and increases bank soundness. However, 
the nominal interest rate does not have a significant impact on bank risk in most regressions. 
Turning to the bank-specific control variables, we find that as in Jimenez et al. (2007) among 
                                                 
14 For example, as discussed in Bonin et al. (2005), until recently the information technology in transition 
countries was only basic, while the human capital necessary to make even prudent lending decisions and to 
price risk properly was sparse or non-existent. However, these conditions were obviously improved since 
enhancement of quality and availability of financial services, adoption of modern banking skills and technology, 
and increase in the quality of human capital, either by importing high skilled bank managers to work in their 
branches or by training the local employees are among the major benefits of foreign banks entry in emerging 
markets (Levine, 1996; Lensink and Hermes, 2004).  
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others, size has a negative impact on non-performing loan to total loan ratios which can be 
associated to better credit quality systems and corporate governance in larger banks. Finally, 
more efficient control of expenses (i.e. lower non-interest expenses to total revenue) 
contributes to bank soundness, although it does not appear to influence credit risk.  
 
5. Conclusions  
 In this paper we analyzed the relationship between bank risk-taking, market power 
and regulations. On the basis of theoretical arguments we restrict our analysis to regulations 
related to capital requirements, restrictions on activities, and official supervisory power. The 
focus of the empirical tests is placed on whether these regulations have an independent effect 
on risk, whether their effect is transmitted via the level of bank market power or whether 
regulations and market power have a combined effect on bank risk. 
We find that market power lowers both the non-performing loans and the overall 
insolvency risk. Capital requirements and supervisory power have a direct impact on credit 
risk by reducing non-performing loans. However, the stabilizing effects of capital regulations 
diminish when the banks have sufficient market power to increase their credit risk. 
Restrictions on activities do not have a direct effect on credit risk; however, there appears to 
be an indirect impact through market power. Supervisory power is also effective in reducing 
insolvency risk but as in the case of credit risk, this effect is independent of market power. In 
contrast, capital requirements do not influence directly the overall insolvency risk; however, 
they have an indirect effect that is channeled through market power. Finally, restrictions on 
activities have now both a direct and indirect effect by reducing insolvency risk, which 
however depends on the market power of banks. Overall, it appears that ignoring the 
interactions between regulations and market power leads to erroneous inferences about the 
impact of regulations on both credit risk and overall risk. 
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Table 1  
Descriptive statistics 
  Albania  Bulgaria  Croatia  
Czech 
Republic  Estonia  Hungary  Latvia  Lithuania  Poland  Romania  Serbia  Slovakia Slovenia 
C 69,154 88,883 99,019 182,144 39,124 52,561 26,866 50,841 37,575 181,908 52,033 57,204 78,993 
q 1,250,249 570,526 801,410 2,176,524 299,970 592,536 401,117 464,642 372,176 999,085 709,106 513,303 707,699 
d 739,089 594,317 755,746 1,396,645 266,024 497,314 262,829 409,320 304,216 728,355 613,683 463,144 609,897 
w1 0.047 0.068 0.065 0.088 0.071 0.078 0.047 0.07 0.058 0.082 0.053 0.058 0.064 
w2 0.009 0.011 0.015 0.017 0.012 0.013 0.014 0.012 0.018 0.010 0.011 0.015 0.022 
w3 0.601 0.503 0.515 0.388 0.620 0.410 0.437 0.508 0.405 0.519 0.725 0.428 0.370 
pq 0.127 0.178 0.158 0.147 0.189 0.145 0.112 0.15 0.152 0.142 0.142 0.156 0.139 
cr 0.077 0.039 0.021 0.032 0.046 0.015 0.037 0.023 0.037 0.028 0.043 0.034 0.05 
Z 37.10 43.12 48.15 44.22 43.81 41.12 45.18 47.89 43.74 39.67 38.85 42.59 47.90 
caprq 4.00 6.57 3.86 4.86 4.43 6.00 5.00 3.57 4.57 4.86 5.00 5.00 6.57 
actrs 2.32 2.39 1.96 2.86 1.68 2.68 1.89 2.36 1.96 2.93 2.00 2.57 2.57 
mdisc 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.14 6.43 6.29 6.86 6.00 6.00 4.86 5.00 5.29 6.86 
spower 11.71 11.14 11.14 9.57 13.14 14.00 11.29 12.00 9.29 9.86 6.00 13.14 12.71 
ci 0.456 0.477 0.443 0.385 0.670 0.532 0.458 0.510 0.486 0.498 0.582 0.441 0.362 
ta 1,316,947 699,003 913,947 2,769,430 329,704 661,711 435,659 513,691 410,206 1,745,472 810,592 584,891 778,997 
gdpg 6.45 2.175 4.441 2.8 6.275 3.85 4.475 5.85 4.516 4.05 2.791 3.6 4.45 
ir 1.439 26.85 6.083 7.425 7.43 16.05 8.958 8.583 1.556 9.325 3.190 28.275 10.85 
pub 65.58 31.54 23.19 35.11 50.08 16.45 29.16 54.54 40.85 32.325 53.73 68.79 32.625 
for 48.48 67.16 49 52.475 66.65 60.525 55.29 59.38 44.78 11.51 43.74 15.4 57.52 
Note: C: total expenses; q: total earning assets; d: total deposits and short-term funding; w1: price of funds (interest expenses/total deposits and short-term 
funding); w2: price of labor (personnel expenses/total assets); w3: price of physical capital (total depreciation and other capital expenses/total fixed assets); pq: 
total revenue to total earning assets; cr: non-performing loans/total loans; Z: Z-index of bank risk; caprq: capital requirements index; actrs: restrictions on banks 
activities index; mdisc: market discipline index; spower: official disciplinary power index; ci: total operating costs/total income; ta: total assets; gdpg: annual % 
GDP growth rate; ir: short-term interest rate; pub: % of publicly owned banks in terms of total industry assets; for: % of foreign owned banks in terms of total 
industry assets. Figures other than ratios and indices are in thousand euros. 
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Table 2 
Evolution of competitive conditions in the CEE banking systems (L) 
  Albania Bulgaria Croatia 
Czech 
Republic Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Serbia Slovakia Slovenia 
1998 0.395 0.234 0.662 0.630 0.749 0.347 0.555 0.919 0.714 0.104 0.028 0.436 0.965 
1999 0.361 0.221 0.635 0.582 0.807 0.382 0.677 0.925 0.723 0.127 0.082 0.468 0.915 
2000 0.479 0.273 0.610 0.520 0.860 0.420 0.661 0.946 0.732 0.230 0.059 0.406 0.908 
2001 0.581 0.319 0.590 0.438 0.885 0.385 0.711 0.924 0.742 0.195 -0.146 0.372 0.866 
2002 0.672 0.358 0.582 0.457 0.927 0.361 0.754 0.918 0.771 0.141 -0.053 0.297 0.816 
2003 0.608 0.410 0.625 0.429 0.914 0.358 0.782 0.929 0.800 0.186 -0.014 0.236 0.794 
2004 0.540 0.404 0.640 0.436 0.856 0.387 0.821 0.905 0.675 0.248 -0.089 0.205 0.748 
2005 0.514 0.424 0.637 0.410 0.813 0.346 0.863 0.893 0.636 0.295 0.020 0.171 0.745 
Note: The table presents average estimates of competition (L) for 13 CEE countries over the period 1998-2005. Lower values suggest increased competition and higher 
values increased market power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Reform, competition and risk-taking in the CEE banking system (dependent variable: non-performing loans/total 
loans) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
rt-1  0.614 0.618  0.605  0.626 
  (9.18)*** (9.31)***  (8.92)***  (9.33)*** 
L -0.428 -0.386 -0.389 -0.345 -0.351 -0.327 -0.361 
 (-3.95)*** (-3.12)*** (-3.21)*** (-2.91)*** (-3.09)*** (-2.72)** (-3.06)*** 
L2   0.042     
   (1.27)     
caprq -0.062 -0.057 -0.056   -0.042 -0.031 
 (-3.57)*** (-3.11)*** (-3.03)***   (-2.05)** (-1.79)* 
actrs -0.012 -0.025 -0.026   -0.017 -0.024 
 (-0.61) (-1.40) (-1.48)   (-0.68) (-1.17) 
spower -0.031 -0.047 -0.046   -0.028 -0.039 
 (-2.11)** (-2.81)*** (-2.77)***   (-2.03)** (-2.55)** 
ci 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.031 0.026 0.030 
 (1.48) (1.55) (1.54) (1.42) (1.68) (1.51) (1.64) 
lnta -0.455 -0.431 -0.433 -0.457 -0.434 -0.462 -0.436 
 (-2.07)** (-1.83)* (-1.88)* (-2.11)** (-1.93)** (-2.23)** (-1.96)** 
gdpg -0.108 -0.117 -0.118 -0.106 -0.115 -0.110 -0.101 
 (-6.43)*** (-7.06)*** (-7.15)*** (-6.31)*** (-6.98)*** (-6.50)*** (-6.12)*** 
ir -0.042 -0.036 -0.036 -0.044 -0.039 -0.043 -0.039 
 (-1.80)* (-1.66) (-1.65) (-1.87)* (-1.73) (-1.86)* (-1.73) 
for -0.020 -0.021 -0.021 -0.019 -0.022 -0.020 -0.023 
 (-2.24)** (-2.32)** (-2.32)** (-2.10)** (-2.35)** (-2.26)** (-2.39)** 
pub 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.030 0.031 0.029 0.032 
 (2.80)*** (2.67)** (2.65)** (2.68)** (2.77)** (2.60)** (2.81)*** 
mdisc -0.027 -0.025 -0.024 -0.026 -0.025 -0.027 -0.0.24 
 (-2.48)** (-2.21)** (2.16)** (-2.45)** (-2.25)** (-2.50)** (2.18)** 
L*caprq    1.856 1.877 1.783 1.827 
    (2.12)** (2.23)** (2.00)** (2.14)** 
L*actrs    -2.162 -2.094 -2.097 -2.131 
    (-2.77)*** (-2.59)** (-2.66)** (-2.71)** 
L*spower    0.643 0.702 0.607 0.712 
    (0.70) (0.91) (0.63) (0.98) 
Number of 
countries 
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Observations 3499 3052 3052 3499 3052 3499 3052 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.338   0.323  0.295  
AR(1) (p-value)  0.047 0.040  0.033  0.048 
AR(2) (p-value)  0.340 0.388  0.607  0.585 
Sargan (p-value)  0.347 0.495  0.781  0.609 
Note: Specifications 1 and 4 and 6 correspond to static panel data IV regressions and the rest to dynamic panel data 
models. rt-1 is the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic models. L is the bank-level estimate of market power 
obtained form Eqs. (2) and (3) of the main text. caprq, actrs and spower are indices of capital requirements, activity 
restrictions and supervisory power, respectively (defined comprehensively in the Appendix). ci is the ratio of non-
interest expenses to total revenue and represents the level of technical efficiency. lnta is the natural logarithm of total 
assets and serves as a measure of bank size. gdpg is the country-specific GDP growth rate and ir is a nominal interest 
rate. for is the % of foreign-owned banks in terms of total industry assets. pub is the % of publicly-owned banks in 
terms of total industry assets. mdisc is an index reflecting market discipline (defined comprehensively in the 
Appendix). Wald is a test indicating goodness of fit of the regression, AR(1) and AR(2) are the first and second 
order Arrelano-Bond tests for serial correlation and Sargan is a test for overidentifying restrictions. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses, with *, **, *** representing significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. All models 
include country dummy variables. 
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Table 4 
Reform, competition and risk-taking in the CEE banking system (dependent variable: Z-index) 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
rt-1  0.584 0.601  (0.619)  0.604 
  (6.21)*** (6.48)***  (6.88)***  (6.52)*** 
L 0.317 0.295 0.290 0.248 0.277 0.331 0.275 
 (2.97)*** (2.61)** (2.52)** (2.03)** (2.38)** (3.16)*** (2.35)** 
L2   -0.041     
   (-1.62)     
caprq 0.138 0.107 0.114   0.144 0.118 
 (1.61) (1.12) (1.21)   (1.65) (1.29) 
actrs 0.337 0.342 0.347   0.198 0.214 
 (2.65)** (2.80)*** (2.89)***   (1.71) (1.84)* 
spower 0.346 0.338 0.342   0.331 0.351 
 (2.97)*** (2.85)*** (2.90)***   (2.72)** (3.04)*** 
ci -0.072 -0.084 -0.082 -0.081 -0.089 -0.083 -0.090 
 (-2.10)** (-2.25)** (-2.20)** (-2.15)** (-2.49)** (-2.23)** (-2.52)** 
lnta 0.047 0.036 0.038 0.041 0.047 0.043 0.049 
 (0.97) (0.80) (0.87) (0.82) (0.98) (0.87) (1.04) 
gdpg 0.352 0.310 0.312 0.350 0.324 0.349 0.317 
 (5.52)*** (4.48)*** (4.47)*** (5.37)*** (4.72)*** (5.46)*** (4.57)*** 
ir 0.019 0.015 0.016 0.018 0.014 0.020 0.015 
 (1.49) (1.16) (1.19) (1.45) (1.08) (1.54) (1.23) 
for 0.458 0.447 0.451 0.460 0.428 0.455 0.426 
 (3.25)*** (3.12)*** (3.19)*** (3.31)*** (3.02)*** (3.27)*** (2.96)*** 
pub -0.208 -0.194 -0.197 -0.210 -0.194 -0.212 -0.197 
 (-1.91)** (-1.80)* (-1.83)* (-1.93)** (-1.80)* (-1.99)** (-1.84)* 
mdisc 0.268 0.326 0.331 0.273 0.338 0.327 0.344 
 (2.26)** (3.02)*** (3.15)*** (2.39)** (3.27)*** (2.35)** (3.50)*** 
L*caprq    -2.014 -2.007 -2.149 -2.011 
    (-2.61)** (-2.50)** (-2.89)*** (-2.54)** 
L*actrs    1.987 2.023 1.990 2.031 
    (2.10)** (2.34)** (2.14)** (2.49)** 
L*spower    -0.322 -0.121 -0.312 -0.125 
    (0.42) (0.18) (0.38) (0.22) 
Number of 
countries 
13 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Observations 2055 1727 1727 2055 1727 2055 1727 
Wald (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
R-squared 0.289   0.301  0.286  
AR(1) (p-value)  0.034 0.041  0.037  0.022 
AR(2) (p-value)  0.488 0.456  0.514  0.381 
Sargan (p-value)  0.617 0.597  0.409  0.420 
Note: Specifications 1 and 4 and 6 correspond to static panel data IV regressions and the rest to dynamic panel 
data models. rt-1 is the lagged dependent variable in the dynamic models. L is the bank-level estimate of market 
power obtained form Eqs. (2) and (3) of the main text. caprq, actrs and spower are indices of capital 
requirements, activity restrictions and supervisory power, respectively (defined comprehensively in the 
Appendix). ci is the ratio of non-interest expenses to total revenue and represents the level of technical 
efficiency. lnta is the natural logarithm of total assets and serves as a measure of bank size. gdpg is the country-
specific GDP growth rate and ir is a nominal interest rate. for is the % of foreign-owned banks in terms of total 
industry assets. pub is the % of publicly-owned banks in terms of total industry assets. mdisc is an index 
reflecting market discipline (defined comprehensively in the Appendix). Wald is a test indicating goodness of 
fit of the regression, AR(1) and AR(2) are the first and second order Arrelano-Bond tests for serial correlation 
and Sargan is a test for overidentifying restrictions. t-statistics are reported in parentheses, with *, **, *** 
representing significance at the 10, 5 and 1%, respectively. All models include country dummy variables. 
 
Appendix. Information on regulatory variables 
Variable Category Description 
caprq Capital  
requirements 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-6 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the case of 
questions 7 and 8 (i.e. yes=0, no =1). (1) Is the minimum required capital asset ratio risk-weighted in line with Basle guidelines? (2) Does 
the ratio vary with market risk? (3-5) Before minimum capital adequacy is determined, which of the following are deducted from the book 
value of capital:  (a) market value of loan losses not realized in accounting books? (b) unrealized losses in securities portfolios? (c) 
unrealized foreign exchange losses? (6) Are the sources of funds to be used as capital verified by the regulatory/supervisory authorities? 
(7) Can the initial or subsequent injections of capital be done with assets other than cash or government securities? (8) Can initial 
disbursement of capital be done with borrowed funds?  
mdisc Market 
discipline 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes to questions 1-7 and 0 otherwise, while the opposite occurs in the case of 
questions 8 and 9 (i.e. yes=0, no =1). (1) Is subordinated debt allowable (or required) as part of capital? (2) Are financial institutions 
required to produce consolidated accounts covering all bank and any non-bank financial subsidiaries? (3) Are off-balance sheet items 
disclosed to public? (4) Must banks disclose their risk management procedures to public? (5) Are directors legally liable for 
erroneous/misleading information? (6) Do regulations require credit ratings for commercial banks? (7) Is an external audit by 
certified/licensed auditor a compulsory obligation for banks? (8) Does accrued, though unpaid interest/principal enter the income 
statement while loan is non-performing? (9) Is there an explicit deposit insurance protection system? 
spower Official 
disciplinary 
power 
This variable is determined by adding 1 if the answer is yes and 0 otherwise, for each one of the following fourteen questions: (1) Does 
the supervisory agency have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without the approval of the bank? (2) Are 
auditors required by law to communicate directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank directors or senior 
managers in illicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? (4) 
Can the supervisory authorities force a bank to change its internal organizational structure? (5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank's directors or management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential 
losses? (7) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute dividends? (8) Can the supervisory agency suspend 
director’s decision to distribute bonuses? (9) Can the supervisory agency suspend director’s decision to distribute management fees? (10) 
Can the supervisory agency supersede bank shareholder rights and declare bank insolvent? (11) Does banking law allow supervisory 
agency or any other government agency (other than court) to suspend some or all ownership rights of a problem bank? (12) Regarding 
bank restructuring and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government agency (other than court) supersede 
shareholder rights? (13) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory agency or any other government agency (other 
than court) remove and replace management? (14) Regarding bank restructuring & reorganization, can supervisory agency or any other 
government agency (other than court) remove and replace directors? 
actrs Restrictions on 
banks activities 
The score for this variable is determined on the basis of the level of regulatory restrictiveness for bank participation in: (1) securities 
activities (2) insurance activities (3) real estate activities (4) bank ownership of non-financial firms. These activities can be unrestricted, 
permitted, restricted or prohibited that are assigned the values of 1, 2, 3 or 4 respectively. We use an overall index by calculating the 
average value over the four categories.  
Note: The individual questions and answers were obtained from the World Bank database developed by Barth et al. (2001a, 2006, 2008).  
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